Abstract. SIMD is one of the second round candidates of the SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. In this paper, we present some results on the compression function of SIMD 1.1 (the tweaked version) using the modular difference method. For SIMD-256, We give a free-start near collision attack on the compression function reduced to 20 steps with complexity 2 −107 . And for SIMD-512, we give a free-start near collision attack on the 24-step compression function with complexity 2 208 . Furthermore, we give a distinguisher attack on the full compression function of SIMD-512 with complexity 2 398 . Our attacks are also applicable for the final compression function of SIMD.
Introduction
Hash functions play a fundamental role in modern Cryptography. Due to the collision attacks on the series general hash functions [7, 8, 1] , NIST hosted the SHA-3 hash function competition to select a new cryptographic hash function as the standard [5] . Until November 2008, NIST accepted 51 out of 64 submissions as the first round. In July 2009, NIST announced 14 second round candidates.
The hash function SIMD is one of the second round candidates, and it is designed by Leurent et al [4] . SIMD is a wide-pipe design based on the MD iterative structure. In Indocrypt 2009 [3] , Mendel et al give a distinguisher attack on the SIMD-512 compression function with complexity 5.2 425.8 using a differential distinguisher. Because Mendel et al 's attack, the designers found some bad properties of Feistel structure in SIMD, and they tweaked the SIMD by changing rotation constants and permutations for diffusion between parallel Feistels. The new version is named SIMD. In 2010 [4] , Nikolic et al give the distinguishing attack for the compression function of 12-step SIMD-512 1.1 using the rotation distinguisher [2] . In this paper, we give series cryptanalysis results for the compression functions of the tweaked SIMD-256 and SIMD-512: 1. For SIMD-256 reduced to 20 steps, we give a free-start near collision attack with complexity 2 107 . So far, this is the fist analysis result for the SIMD-256. 2. For SIMD-512 reduced to 24 steps, we give a free-start near collision attack with complexity 2 208 . And for the full SIMD-512 compression function, we give a distinguishing attack with complexity 2 398 using a difference distinguisher.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define some notations and give a brief description of SIMD. In section 3, we give the free-start near collision attack on 20-step SIMD-256. In section 4, we give a near collision attack on the 24-step SIMD-512 and a distinguishing attack for the full SIMD-512. Finally we conclude the paper in section 5.
Notations and Description of SIMD
The following notations can be used in this paper.
Notations
1. + and − denote addition and subtration modular 2 32 .
2. x i,j is the j-th bit of x i , where x i is a 32-bit word and x i,32 is the most significant bit.
x i [j] and x i [−j]
(where x is a 32-bit word) are the resultant values of changing only the j-th bit of the word x i from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 respectively.
is the value resulting by changing the j 1 -th, j 2 -th, ...and j l -th bits of x i . Again the + sign means that the bit is changed from 0 to 1, and the -sign means that the bit is changed from 1 to 0.
5. <<< denote right-shift by n-bit.
6. h i denote the chaining values in step i of SIMD-256 (or SIMD-512).
Description of SIMD
SIMD is an iterative hash function that follow the Merkle-Damgård design. The SIMD family hash function is based on two functions SIMD-256 and SIMD-512. The SIMD-n with n ≤ 256 is defined as a truncation of SIMD-256, and SIMDn with 256 ≤ n ≤ 512 is defined as a truncation of SIMD-512. Each function SIMD-n takes as input a message of arbitrary size, and outputs a digest of n bits. The input message is padded and then divided into k 512-bit (resp. 1024-bit for SIMD-512) blocks for SIMD-256. The compression function of SIMD-256 (resp. SIMD-512) takes a 512-bit (resp. 1024-bit) chaining value and a 512-bit (resp. 1024-bit) message and output another 512-bit (resp. 1024-bit) chaining value. Each 512-bit (resp. 1024-bit) block is first expanded into 4096 bits (resp. 8192 bits ). The compression function of SIMD consist of 4 rounds, and each includes 8 steps. The feed-forward consists of 4 additional steps with the IV as the message input. Each step have 4 (resp. 8 ) parallel Feistel ladders , and they interact together because of the permutations p(i)'s. At each step, a new value is computed in each Feistel ladder, and this new value is sent to another Feistel ladder at the following step. In step i, the j − th feistel ladder is given are as follows:
For SIMD-256, the permutation used at step i is p (imod3) , and it is defined in the following: In this paper, we omit to describe the message expansion algorithm because our attack is independent with the message expansion,.
The Boolean functions Φ used in the first 4 steps of each round is the chosen function IF and last 4 steps is the majority function M AJ. The rotation constants r i and s i can refer to the original paper [4] , and they also are shown in our detail differential path.
3 The Free-start Near Collision Attack on the reduced SIMD-256
In this section, we use the modular differential method to find a differential path with high probability. The modular differential method was presented in Eurocrypt 2005 by Wang et al [7] , and it is a precise differential that uses integer modular subtraction in conjunction with exclusive-or as a measure of difference. There are four steps in attacking a hash function using the modular differential. The first step is to select an appropriate message or initial value difference, which determines the success probability of the attack. The key step of the modular differential attack is to select a feasible differential path according to the selected message difference or initial value difference. This difficult step requires intelligent analysis, sophisticated technique, lots of patience and good luck. The third phase is to derive the sufficient conditions that guarantee the feasibility of the differential path. In the process of searching for differential paths, the chaining variable conditions can be determined. A feasible differential path implies that all the chaining variable conditions deduced from the path do not contradict each other. The last step is the message/IV modification which forces the modified messages/IV to satisfy additional sufficient conditions.
Constructing the Specific Differential Path for 20-step SIMD-256
In this attack, the difference is only introduced in the IV because the expanded message has a minimal distance of 520 (resp. 1032) for SIMD-256 (resp. SIMD-512). Before the search of the differential path, we observe that the difference propagation of SIMD is slower in the backward direction than the forward direction. Our basic attack strategy is first to introduce one bit difference in the mediate chaining value and trace this difference forward and backward direction using the modular difference method to get a difference path with high probability. Because the IV is introduced in the four feed-forward steps as messages, we then adjust the differential path slightly so that the differences in IV can be used to cancel some difference of the the feed-forward steps.
For the SIMD-256, we introduce 1-bit initial difference in the last ladder of the 16-th step, and go 16 steps in the backward direction to obtain the initial difference, then we trace this difference in the forward direction for 4 steps to get a 20-step differential path which is shown in Table 1 . From the Table 1 , we observe that the difference d 20 [−18] of the forth ladder can be canceled by introducing a difference in d 0 of the first ladder. And then we expand the difference b 0 [−13] to b 0 [13, 14, ..., −18] to offset the impact in the computation of a 1 of the first ladder. This way, we go forward another four steps under the specific IV difference to get the difference in the chaining values of the feed-forward. It's easy to compute the probability of the differential path of Table 1 which holds with probability 2 −203 for the selected IV difference. The sufficient conditions for the path of Table 1 is given in Table 2 .
Message/IV Modification
In order to get a free-start near collision, we need to carry out the message or IV modification technique to fulfill the conditions in the IV and the chaining vales in the first round. In this section, we use the message/IV modification to fulfill the conditions in IV and a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , and a 4 . For convenient to describe, we denote the chaining values x i in the j ladder x j i . 1. From the Table 2 In fact, we can also modify the conditions in a 5 and a 6 , even a 7 and a 8 , but it's more expensive and need to set many pre-conditions. It's worth to note that the conditions a can not be modified using the IV modification, because the additional conditions needed to modify these bits are contradict with the fix conditions in Table 2 . We can modify these four conditions by the corresponding message. Due to the message expansion, we can not select the message completely arbitrary. So we use the IV modification as much as possible instead of message modification .
After the message/IV modification for the IV and a 1 ∼ a 4 , the differential path in Table 1 hold with probability 2 −107 . This way, we can find a 25-bit free-start near collision for the 20-step SIMD-256 with complexity 2 107 which is higher than the birthday attack. In this section, we will show that finding a free-start near collision for the 24-step SIMD-512 can be done with less effort than the birthday attack using our differential path. Similar to the Section 3, we introduce the 1-bit difference in chaining value of the 20-th step, and trace the difference in the forward and backward direction using the modular difference method. We get a near-collision differential path for 24-step SIMD-512 in Table 3 . The probability for the differential path hold is about 2 −352 . We utilize the message/IV modification technique to fulfill the 144 conditions in IV and a 1 ∼ a 4 . After the message/IV modification, the complexity to find a 47-bit free-start near collision for 24-step SIMD-512 is about 2 208 .
A differential distinguisher for the compression function of full SIMD-512
Our strategy to find a differential path for the full SIMD-512 is different from that of the 24-step near collision differential path. We also start from 1-bit difference in the the 24-th step and trace this difference in backward direction. We expand the difference completely from the 8-th down to 3-th step, and shrink the difference from the 2-th step so that we can get the IV difference as little as possible. The differential distinguisher for the full SIMD-512 compression function is shown in Table 4 , and its most expensive part focus on 3-9 steps. Table 5 , go to step 4; Otherwise, return step 1.
4. Compute h 9 ∼ h 36 and h 9 ∼ h 36 in the forward direction using h 8 and h 8 . If the differences ∆h 36 is equal to the fixed output difference in Table 5 , stop; Otherwise, go back step 1.
By running the algorithm above, we can find a pair (M, IV ) and (M, IV ) which has the fixed input and output differences in Table 5 with complexity  about 2 398 . By using the more sophisticated message/IV modification techniques, the complexity can be improved furtherly. But for the random function with output length n-bit, to find a pair plain (P, P ) which satisfy the fixed input and output difference has the probability 2 −n . So our differential distinguisher is applicable for both the compression function and the final compression function of SIMD.
Conclusions
In this paper, we find some differential paths using the modular difference method for reduced and full SIMD compression functions. Based on our differential path, we give the free-start near collision and distinguisher attack for the SIMD. Our attack does not contract with the security claims of the designer. Table 3 . The near-collision differential path for 24-step SIMD-512. 
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